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Abstract
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), introduced in the context of software protection by Goldreich and Os-
trovsky [JACM’96], aims at obfuscating the memory access pattern induced by a RAM computation.
Ideally, the memory access pattern of an ORAM should be independent of the data being processed.
Since the work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky, it was believed that there is an inherent Ω(logn) bandwidth
overhead in any ORAM working with memory of size n. Larsen and Nielsen [CRYPTO’18] were the
first to give a general Ω(logn) lower bound for any online ORAM, i.e., an ORAM that must process its
inputs in an online manner.
In this work, we revisit the lower bound of Larsen and Nielsen, which was proved under the assumption
that the adversarial server knows exactly which server accesses correspond to which input operation. We
give an Ω(logn) lower bound for the bandwidth overhead of any online ORAM even when the adversary
has no access to this information. For many known constructions of ORAM this information is provided
implicitly as each input operation induces an access sequence of roughly the same length. Thus, they are
subject to the lower bound of Larsen and Nielsen. Our results rule out a broader class of constructions
and specifically, they imply that obfuscating the boundaries between the input operations does not help
in building a more efficient ORAM.
As our main technical contribution and to handle the lack of structure, we study the properties of
access graphs induced naturally by the memory access pattern of an ORAM computation. We identify a
particular graph property that can be efficiently tested and that all access graphs of ORAM computation
must satisfy with high probability. This property is reminiscent of the Larsen-Nielsen property but it is
substantially less structured; that is, it is more generic.
∗This research was supported in part by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic under the grant agreement no. 19-27871X,
by the Charles University projects PRIMUS/17/SCI/9 and UNCE/SCI/004, Charles University grant SVV-2017-260452, and
by the Neuron Fund for the support of science.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
03
38
5v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
3 S
ep
 20
19
1 Introduction
Oblivious simulation of RAM machines, initially studied in the context of software protection by Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [GO96], aims at protecting the memory access pattern induced by computation of a RAM
from an eavesdropper. In the present day, such oblivious simulation might be needed when performing a
computation in the memory of an untrusted server.1 Despite using encryption for protecting the content
of each memory cell, the memory access pattern might still leak sensitive information. Thus, the memory
access pattern should be oblivious of the data being processed and, optimally, depend only on the size of the
input.
Constructions. The strong guarantee of obliviousness of the memory access pattern comes at the cost
of additional overhead. A trivial solution which scans the whole memory for each memory access induces
linear bandwidth overhead, i.e., the multiplicative factor by which the length of a memory access pattern
increases in the oblivious simulation of a RAM with n memory cells. Given its many practical applications,
an important research direction is to construct an ORAM with as low overhead as possible. The foundational
work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] already gave a construction with bandwidth overhead O(log3(n)).
Subsequent results introduced various improved approaches for building ORAMs (see [Ajt10, CLP14, CP13,
DMN11, GGH+13, GO96, GM11, GMOT11, KLO12, PPRY18, RFK+14, SvDS+18, WCS15, WHC+14]
and the references therein) leading to the recent construction of Asharov et al. [AKL+18] with bandwidth
overhead O(log n) for the most natural setting of parameters.
Lower-bounds. It was a folklore belief that an Ω(log n) bandwidth overhead is inherent based on a lower
bound presented already in the initial work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96]. However, the Goldreich-
Ostrovsky result was recently revisited in the work of Boyle and Naor [BN16], who pointed out that the
lower bound actually holds only in a rather restricted “balls and bins” model where the ORAM is not allowed
to read the content of the data cells it processes. In fact, Boyle and Naor showed that any general lower
bound for offline ORAM (i.e., where each memory access of the ORAM can depend on the whole sequence
of operations it needs to obliviously simulate) implies non-trivial lower bounds on sizes of sorting circuits
which seem to be out of reach of the known techniques in computational complexity. The connection between
offline ORAM lower bounds and circuit lower bounds was extended to read-only online ORAMs (i.e., where
only the read operations are processed in online manner) by Weiss and Wichs [WW18] who showed that
lower bounds on bandwidth overhead for read-only online ORAMs would imply non-trivial lower bounds for
sorting circuits or locally decodable codes.
The first general Ω(log n) lower bound for bandwidth overhead in online ORAM (i.e., where the ORAM
must process sequentially the operations it has to obliviously simulate) was given by Larsen and Nielsen [LN18].
The core of their lower bound comprised of adapting the information transfer technique of Patrascu and
Demaine [PD06], originally used for proving lower bounds for data structures in the cell probe model, to the
ORAM setting. In fact, the lower bound of Larsen and Nielsen [LN18] for ORAM can be cast as a lower
bound for the oblivious Array Maintenance problem and it was recently extended to other oblivious data
structures by Jacob et al. [JLN19].
1.1 Our Results
In this work, we further develop the information transfer technique of [PD06] when applied in the context of
online ORAMs. We revisit the lower bound of Larsen and Nielsen which was proved under the assumption
that the adversarial server knows exactly which server accesses correspond to each input operation. Specif-
ically, we prove a stronger matching lower bound in a relaxed model without any restriction on the format
of the access sequence to server memory.
1Protecting the memory access of a computation is particularly relevant in the light of the recent Spectre [KGG+18] and
Meltdown [LSG+18] attacks.
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Note that the [LN18] lower bound does apply to the known constructions of ORAMs where it is possible
to implicitly separate the accesses corresponding to individual input operations – since each input operation
generates an access sequence of roughly the same length. However, the [LN18] result does not rule out
the possibility of achieving sub-logarithmic overhead in an ORAM which obfuscates the boundaries in the
access pattern (e.g. by translating input operations into variable-length memory accesses). We show that
obfuscating the boundaries between the input operations does not help in building a more efficient ORAM. In
other words, our lower bound justifies the design choice of constructing ORAMs where each input operation
is translated to roughly the same number of probes to server memory (common to the known constructions
of ORAMs).
Besides online ORAM (i.e., the oblivious Array Maintenance problem), our techniques naturally extend
to other oblivious data structures and allow to generalize also the recent lower bounds of Jacob et al. [JLN19]
for oblivious stacks, queues, deques, priority queues and search trees.
For online ORAMs with statistical security, our results are stated in the following informal theorem.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Any statistically secure online ORAM with internal memory of size m has expected
bandwidth overhead Ω(log n), where n ≥ m2 is the length of the sequence of input operations. This result
holds even when the adversarial server has no information about boundaries between probes corresponding to
different input operations.
In the computational setting, we consider two definitions of computational security. Our notion of
weak computational security requires that no polynomial time algorithm can distinguish access sequences
corresponding to any two input sequences of the same length – this is closer in spirit to computational
security for ORAMs previously considered in the literature. The notion of strong computational security
requires computational indistinguishability even when the distinguisher is given the two input sequences
together with an access sequence corresponding to one of them. The distinguisher should not be able to tell
which one of the two input sequences produced the access sequence. Interestingly, our technique (as well
as the proof technique of [LN18] in the model with structured access pattern) yields different lower bounds
with respect to the two definitions stated in the following informal theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Any weakly computationally secure online ORAM with internal memory of size m
must have expected bandwidth overhead ω(1). Any strongly computationally secure online ORAM with inter-
nal memory of size m must have expected bandwidth overhead Ω(log n), where n ≥ m2 is the length of the
sequence of input operations. This result holds even when the adversarial server has no information about
boundaries between probes corresponding to different input operations.
Note that even the ω(1) lower bound for online ORAMs satisfying weak computational security is an
interesting result in the light of the work of Boyle and Naor [BN16]. It follows from [BN16] that any super-
constant lower bound for offline ORAM would imply super-linear lower bounds on size of sorting circuits
– which would constitute a major breakthrough in computational complexity (for additional discussion, see
Section 5). Our techniques clearly do not provide lower bounds for offline ORAMs. On the other hand,
we believe that proving the ω(1) lower bound in any meaningful weaker model would amount to proving
lower bounds for offline ORAM or read-only online ORAM which would have important implications in
computational complexity.
Alternative Definitions of ORAM. Previous works considered various alternative definitions of ORAM.
We clarify the ORAMmodel in which our techniques yield a lower bound in Section 2.1 and discuss its relation
to other models in Section 5. As an additional contribution, we demonstrate an issue with the definition
of ORAM appearing in Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96]. Specifically, we show that the definition can be
satisfied by a RAM with constant overhead and no meaningful security. The definition of ORAM in Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [GO96] differs from the original definition in Goldreich [Gol87] and Ostrovsky [Ost90], which
do not share the issue we observed in the definition from Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96]. Given that the
work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] might serve as a primary reference for our community, we explain
the issue in Section 5 to help preventing the use of the problematic definition in future works.
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Persiano and Yeo [PY19] recently adapted the chronogram technique [FS89] from the literature on data
structure lower bounds to prove a lower bound for differentially private RAMs (a relaxation of ORAMs in
the spirit of differential privacy [DMNS06] which ensures indistinguishability only for input sequences that
differ in a single operation). Similarly to the work of Larsen and Nielsen [LN18], the proof in [PY19] exploits
the fact that the distinguisher knows exactly which server accesses correspond to each input operation.
However, as the chronogram technique significantly differs from the information transfer approach, we do
not think that our techniques would directly allow to strengthen the [PY19] lower bound for differentially
private RAMs and prove it in the model with an unstructured access pattern.
1.2 Our Techniques
The structure of our proof follows a similar blueprint as the work of Larsen and Nielsen [LN18]. However,
we must handle new issues introduced by the more general adversarial model. Most significantly, our proof
cannot rely on any formatting of the access pattern, whereas Larsen and Nielsen leveraged the fact that the
access pattern is split into blocks corresponding to each read/write operation. To handle the lack of structure
in the access pattern, we study the properties of the access graph induced naturally by the access pattern
of an ORAM computation. We identify a particular graph property that can be efficiently tested and that
all access graphs of ORAM computation must satisfy with high probability. This property is reminiscent of
the Larsen-Nielsen property but it is substantially less structured; that is, it is more generic.
The access graph is defined as follows: the vertices are timestamps of server probes and there is an edge
connecting two vertices if and only if they correspond to two subsequent accesses to the same memory cell.
We define a graph property called `-dense k-partition. Roughly speaking, graphs with `-dense k-partitions
are graphs which may be partitioned into k disjoint subgraphs, each subgraph having at least ` edges. We
show that this property has to be satisfied (with high probability) by access graphs induced by an ORAM
for any k and an appropriate `. To leverage this inherent structure of access graph towards a lower bound
on bandwidth overhead, we prove that if a graph has `k -dense k-partition for some ` and K different values
of k then the graph must have at least Ω(` logK) edges. In Section 3, we provide the formal definition of
access graph and `-dense k-partitions and prove a lower bound on the expected number of edges for a graph
that has many `-dense k-partitions.
In Section 4, we prove that access graphs of ORAMs have many dense partitions. Specifically, using
a communication-type argument we show that for Ω(n) values of k, there exist input sequences for which
the corresponding graph has Ω(nk )-dense k-partition with high probability. Applying the indistinguishability
of sequences of probes made by ORAM, we get one sequence for which its access graph satisfies nk -dense
k-partition for Ω(n) values of k with high probability. Combining the above results from Section 4 with the
results from Section 3, we get that the graph of such a sequence has Ω(n log n) edges, and thus by definition,
Ω(n log n) vertices in expectation. This implies that the expected number of probes made by the ORAM on
any input sequence of length n is Ω(n log n).
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some basic notation and recall some standard definitions and results. Through-
out the rest of the paper, we let [n] for n ∈ N to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. A function negl(n) : N→ R is
negligible if it approaches zero faster than any inverse polynomial.
Definition 2.1 (Statistical Distance). For two probability distributions X and Y on a discrete universe S,
we define statistical distance of X and Y as
SD (X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X = s]− Pr[Y = s]| .
We use the following observation, which characterizes statistical distance as the difference of areas under
the curve (see Fact 3.1.9 in Vadhan [Vad99]).
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Proposition 2.2. Let X and Y be probability distributions on a discrete universe S, let SX = {s ∈
S : Pr[X = s] > Pr[Y = s]}, and define SY analogously. Then
SD (X,Y ) = Pr[X ∈ SX ]− Pr[Y ∈ SX ] = Pr[Y ∈ SY ]− Pr[X ∈ SY ] .
We also use the following data-processing-type inequality.
Proposition 2.3. Let X and Y be probability distributions on a discrete universe S. Then for any function
f : S → {0, 1}, it holds that |Pr[f(X) = 1]− Pr[f(Y ) = 1]| ≤ SD (X,Y ).
Definition 2.4 (Computational indistinguishability). Two probability ensembles, {Xn}n∈N and {Yn}n∈N,
are computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that
|Pr[D(Xn, 1n) = 1]− Pr[D(Yn, 1n) = 1]| ≤ negl(n) .
2.1 Online ORAM
In this section, we present the formal definition for online oblivious RAM (ORAM) we consider in our work
– we build on the oblivious cell-probe model of Larsen and Nielsen [LN18].
Definition 2.5 (Array Maintenance Problem [LN18]). The Array Maintenance problem with parameters
(`, w) is to maintain an array B of ` w-bit entries under the following two operations:
• (W,a, d): Set the content of B[a] to d, where a ∈ [`], d ∈ {0, 1}w. (Write operation)
• (R, a, d): Return the content of B[a], where a ∈ [`] (note that d is ignored). (Read operation)
We say that a machineM implements the Array Maintenance problem with parameters (`, w) and probability
p, if for every input sequence of operations
y = (o1, a1, d1), . . . , (on, an, dn), where each oi ∈ {R,W} , ai ∈ [`], di ∈ {0, 1}w ,
and for every read operation in the sequence y,M returns the correct answer with probability at least p.
Definition 2.6 (Online Oblivious RAM). For m,w ∈ N, let RAM*(m,w) denote a probabilistic random
access machineM with m cells of internal memory, each of size w bits, which has access to a data structure,
called server, implementing the Array Maintenance problem with parameters (2w, w) and probability 1. In
other words, in each step of computationM may probe the server on a triple (o, a, d) ∈ {R,W}×[2w]×{0, 1}w
and on every input (R, a, d) the server returns toM the data last written in B[a]. We say that RAM∗ probes
the server whenever it makes an Array Maintenance operation to the server.
Let m,M,w be any natural numbers such that M ≤ 2w. An online Oblivious RAM M with address
rangeM , cell size w bits and m cells of internal memory is a RAM∗(m,w) satisfying online access sequence,
correctness, and statistical (resp. computational) security as defined below.
Online Access Sequence: For any input sequence y = y1, . . . , yn the RAM* machine M gets yi one
by one, where each yi ∈ {R,W} × [M ]× {0, 1}w. Upon the receipt of each operation yi, the machineM
generates a possibly empty sequence of server probes (o1, a1, d1), . . . , (o`i , a`i , d`i), where each (oi, ai, di) ∈
{R,W} × [2w] × {0, 1}w, and updates its internal memory state in order to correctly implement the
request yi. We define the access sequence corresponding to yi as A(M, yi) = a1, a2, . . . , a`i . For the
input sequence y, the access sequence A(M, y) is defined as
A(M, y) = A(M, y1), A(M, y2), A(M, y3), . . . , A(M, yn).
Note that the definition of the machineM is online, and thus for each input sequence y = y1, . . . , yn and
each i ∈ [n− 1], the access sequence A(M, yi) does not depend on yi+1, . . . , yn.
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Figure 1: Schema of online ORAM from Definition 2.6.
Correctness: M implements the Array Maintenance problem with parameters (M,w) with probability
at least 1− pfail.
Statistical Security: For any two input sequences y, y′ of the same length, the statistical distance of
the distributions of access sequences A(M, y) and A(M, y′) is at most 14 .
Computational Security: For computational security, we consider infinite families of ORAM where
we allow m,M,w to be functions of the length n of the input sequence. We distinguish between the
following two notions:
Weak Computational Security: For any infinite families of input sequences {yn}n∈N and {y′n}n∈N
such that |yn| = |y′n| ≥ n for all n ∈ N, the probability ensembles {A(M, yn)}n∈N and {A(M, y′n)}n∈N
are computationally indistinguishable.
Strong Computational Security: For any infinite families of input sequences {yn}n∈N and {y′n}n∈N
such that |yn| = |y′n| ≥ n for all n ∈ N, the probability ensembles {(yn, y′n, A(M, yn))}n∈N and
{(yn, y′n, A(M, y′n))}n∈N are computationally indistinguishable.
The parameters of our ORAM model from Definition 2.6 are depicted in Figure 2.1. We use different
sizes of arrows on server and RAM side to denote the asymmetry of the communication (the RAM sends
type of operation, address, and data and the server returns requested data in case of a read operation and
dummy value in case of a write operation). Note that the input sequence y of ORAM consists of a sequence
of all operations, whereas the access sequence A(M, y) consists of a sequence of addresses of all probes.
Arguably, a user of an ORAM might want the stronger notion of computational security whereas the
weaker notion is closer to the past considerations. Note that in the case of weak computational security, the
adversarial distinguisher does not have access to the input sequences. Thus, it is restricted to contain only
constant amount of information about the whole families of input sequences {yn}n and {y′n}n. In contrast,
in the case of strong computational security, the adversarial distinguisher is given also the input sequences.
Thus, it is able to compute any polynomial time computable information about the input sequences. This
distinction is crucial for our results, as we are able to prove only an ω(1) lower bound for weak security as
opposed to the Ω(log n) lower bound for strong security (see Theorem 4.10 and Theorem 4.9). Nevertheless,
we believe that the known constructions of ORAM satisfy the notion of strong computational security.
For ease of exposition, in the rest of the paper we assume perfect correctness of the ORAM (i.e., pfail = 0).
However, our lower bounds can be extended also to ORAMs with imperfect correctness (see Remark 4.3).
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Finally, our lower bounds hold also for semi-offline ORAMs where the ORAM machineM receives the type
and address of each operation in advance and it has to process in online manner only the data to be written
during each write operation (see Remark 4.4).
3 Dense Graphs
In this section, we define an efficiently testable property of graphs that we show to be satisfied by graphs
induced by the access pattern of any statistically secure ORAM. This property implies that the overhead of
such ORAM must be logarithmic.
We say a directed graph G = (V,E) is ordered if V is a subset of integers and for each edge (u, v) ∈ E,
u < v. For a graph G = (V,E) and S, T ⊆ V , we let E(S, T ) ⊆ E be the set of edges that start in S and
end in T , and for integers a ≤ m ≤ b ∈ V we let E(a,m, b) = E({a, a+ 1, . . . ,m− 1}, {m,m+ 1, . . . , b− 1}).
Definition 3.1. A k-partition of an ordered graph G = (V = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, E) is a sequence 0 =
b0 ≤ m0 ≤ b1 ≤ m1 ≤ · · · ≤ bk = N . We say that the k-partition is `-dense if for each i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
E(bi,mi, bi+1) is of size at least `.
There is a simple greedy algorithm running in time O(|V |2 ·|E|) which tests for given integers k, ` whether
a given ordered graph G = (V,E) has an `-dense k-partition. (The algorithm looks for the k parts one by
one greedily from left to right.)
Lemma 3.2. Let K ⊆ N be a subset of powers of 4. Let ` ∈ N be given. Let G = ({0, . . . , N − 1}, E) be an
ordered graph which for each k ∈ K has an (`/k)-dense k-partition. Then G has at least `2 · |K| edges.
Proof. We use the following claim to bound the number of edges.
Claim 3.3. Let k > k′ > 0 be integers. Let 0 = b0 ≤ m0 ≤ b1 ≤ m1 ≤ · · · ≤ bk = N be a k-partition of
G, and 0 = b′0 ≤ m′0 ≤ b′1 ≤ m′1 ≤ · · · ≤ b′k′ = N be a k′-partition of G. Then for at least k − k′ distinct
i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}
E(bi,mi, bi+1) ∩
⋃
j∈{0,...,k′−1}
E(b′j ,m
′
j , b
′
j+1) = ∅. (1)
Proof. For any j ∈ {0, . . . , k′ − 1} and (u, v) ∈ E(b′j ,m′j , b′j+1), if (u, v) ∈ E(bi,mi, bi+1) for some i then
bi < m
′
j < bi+1 (as bi ≤ u < m′j ≤ v ≤ bi+1.) Thus, i is uniquely determined by j. Hence, E(bi,mi, bi+1)
may intersect
⋃
j∈{0,...,k′−1}E(b
′
j ,m
′
j , b
′
j+1) only if bi ≤ m′j < bi+1, for some j ∈ {0, . . . , k′ − 1}. Thus, such
an intersection occurs only for at most k′ different i. The claim follows.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.2. For each k ∈ K, pick an (`/k)-dense k-partition 0 = b0 ≤ m0 ≤
b1 ≤ m1 ≤ · · · ≤ bk = N of G and define the set of edges Ek:
Ek =
⋃
i∈{0,...,k−1}
E(bi,mi, bi+1).
For each k ∈ K, we lower-bound
∣∣∣Ek \⋃k′∈K,k′<k Ek′ ∣∣∣ by `/2. SinceK contains powers of 4,∑k′∈K,k′<k k′ ≤
k/2. By the above claim, for at least k −∑k′∈K,k′<k k′ ≥ k/2 different i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, E(bi,mi, bi+1) ∩⋃
k′∈K,k′<k Ek′ = ∅. By density, |E(bi,mi, bi+1)| ≥ `/k, so
∣∣∣Ek \⋃k′∈K,k′<k Ek′ ∣∣∣ ≥ `k · k2 = `/2. Hence,∣∣⋃
k∈K Ek
∣∣ = ∑k∈K ∣∣∣Ek \⋃k′∈K,k′<k Ek′ ∣∣∣ ≥ |K| · `2 .
In the following corollary, we show that the property of having many dense partitions with some proba-
bility implies proportionally many edges. (Note that the blog4 tc − dlog4 se term corresponds exactly to the
number of powers of four between s and t.)
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Corollary 3.4. Let `, s, t be natural numbers, where s ≤ t. Let p ∈ [0, 1] be a real. Let G be an ordered
graph picked at random from a distribution such that for each integer k, s ≤ k ≤ t, the randomly chosen
ordered graph G has (`/k)-dense k-partition with probability at least p. Then the expected number of edges
in G is at least p`2 · (blog4 tc − dlog4 se).
Proof. Let K be the set of integers such that k ∈ K if and only if k is a power of 4 and G has an (`/k)-dense
k-partition. K is a random variable. The expected size of K is at least p(blog4 tc−dlog4 se). By Lemma 3.2,
the expected number of edges in G is at least `2 · p · (blog4 tc − dlog4 se).
4 ORAM Lower Bound
In this section, we fix integers n,m,M,w ≥ 1 such that m ≤ √n, n ≤ M ≤ 2w, and an ORAM M
with address range M , cell size w and m cells of internal memory (see Definition 2.6). We argue that any
statistically secure ORAM M must make Ω(n log n) server probes in expectation in order to implement a
sequence of n input operations. We also show that any ORAMM satisfying Weak Computational Security
must make ω(n) server probes in expectation on any input sequence of length n.
Definition 4.1. Let A(M, y) = a0, . . . , aN−1 be an access sequence of M for some input sequence y. We
define a directed graph G(A(M, y)) = (V,E) called access graph as follows: V = {0, . . . , N−1} and (i, j) ∈ E
iff i < j and ai = aj and for each k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , j − 1}, ak 6= ai.
Notice that every vertex of an access graph has outdegree as well as indegree at most one.
In the following, we consider input sequences of even length n ∈ N. First, we define a sequence of
alternating writes and reads at address a = 1 with data d = 0w as Yn,0 = [(W, 1, 0w), (R, 1, 0w)]
n/2. Second,
for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n2}, let ` = ⌊ n2k⌋, we define a distribution Yn,k of input sequences as
Yn,k =(W, 1, b1,1), (W, 2, b1,2), . . . , (W, `, b1,`), (R, 1, 0
w), (R, 2, 0w), . . . , (R, `, 0w),
(W, 1, b2,1), (W, 2, b2,2), . . . , (W, `, b2,`), (R, 1, 0
w), (R, 2, 0w), . . . , (R, `, 0w),
. . . ,
(W, 1, bk,1), (W, 2, bk,2), . . . , (W, `, bk,`), (R, 1, 0
w), (R, 2, 0w), . . . , (R, `, 0w),
(W, 1, 0w), (R, 1, 0w), (W, 1, 0w), . . . , (R, 1, 0w) ,
where each bi,j ∈ {0, 1}w is an independently uniformly chosen bit string. We define the i-th block of writes
Wi = (W, 1, bi,1), (W, 2, bi,2), . . . , (W, `, bi,`) and the i-th block of reads Ri to be the sequence of operations
(R, 1, 0w), (R, 2, 0w), . . . , (R, `, 0w) following right after Wi. Note that after the k-th block of reads the
sequence is padded to length n by a sequence of alternating writes and reads. For an ORAMM, we use the
notation Gn,k = G(A(M, Yn,k)) and Gn,0 = G(A(M, Yn,0)) whenM is clear from the context.
The following lemma uses only correctness of ORAM and does not depend on its security. The proof of
the lemma uses the information transfer technique similarly to Lemma 2 in [LN18].
Lemma 4.2. Let n,m,M,w,M be as in the beginning of this section, moreover suppose n ≥ 10 is an even
integer. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer such that k ≤ n10(m+2 logn+11) . Let A(M, Yn,k) be the access sequence of
M and Gn,k be the corresponding access graph. (Gn,k is a random variable that depends on Yn,k and the
internal randomness ofM.) With probability at least 1− 1n , Gn,k has (n/5k)-dense k-partition.
Proof. By our assumption from the beginning of this section, n ≤M , and thus for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n2 } all
sequences Yn,k have all addresses in the correct range. Fix any k satisfying the assumptions of this lemma
and set ` =
⌊
n
2k
⌋
. As defined before let Wi and Ri be the i-th block of writes and reads in Yn,k, respectively.
Let Ui be the vertices of Gn,k corresponding to Wi, and Vi be the vertices corresponding to Ri. It suffices
to prove that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the probability that there are fewer than n/5k edges between Ui and
Vi is less than 1/n2. If this holds then by the union bound the lemma follows.
For contradiction, assume there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the probability that there are fewer than
n/5k edges between Ui and Vi is at least 1/n2. Here, the randomness is taken over the choice of an input
8
sequence y ← Yn,k and the internal randomness of M. Fix such an i. Fix all the randomness except for
the choice of bi,1, . . . , bi,` in Yn,k so that Gn,k obtained from this restricted distribution has fewer than n/5k
edges between Ui and Vi with probability ≥ 1/n2 over the choice of bi,1, . . . , bi,`. (This is possible by an
averaging argument.) Let B ⊆ {0, 1}w×` be the set of choices for bi,1, . . . , bi,` which give fewer than n/5k
edges between Ui and Vi in Gn,k. Clearly, |B| ≥ 2w`/n2.
We use M to construct a deterministic protocol that transmits any string from B from Alice to Bob,
two communicating parties, using at most log |B| − 10 bits. That gives a contradiction as such an efficient
transmission violates the pigeon-hole principle.
On input b ∈ B to Alice, Alice sends a single message to Bob who can determine b from the message.
They proceed as follows. Both Alice and Bob simulateM on Yn,k up until reaching Wi. All the randomness
used before the i-th block of writes Wi is fixed and known both to Alice and Bob. Then Alice continues with
the simulation of M on Wi with data bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,` set to b. Once she finishes it, she sends the content
of the internal memory of M to Bob using wm bits. Then Alice continues with the simulation of M on
Ri and whenever M makes a server probe to read from a location that was written last time during the
simulation of Wi, Alice sends over the address and the content of that cell to Bob. Overall, Alice sends at
most mw + 2wn/5k bits of communication to Bob that can be concatenated into a single message of this
size.
On receiving side, Bob uses the internal state of M communicated by Alice to continue with the com-
putation on Ri, while he uses the state of the server he obtained initially before reaching Wi. He simulates
all server probes by himself, except for read operations that match the list sent by Alice, where he initially
uses the content provided by Alice. Clearly, Bob can determine b from the simulation.
As k ≤ n10(m+2 logn+11) , mw+ 2wn/5k ≤ (n/2k − 2 log n− 11)w, so mw+ 2wn/5k ≤ (`− 2 log n− 10)w,
hence, the number of communicated bits is mw + 2wn/5k ≤ log |B| − (2w − 2) log n − 10w, which is a
contradiction.
Remark 4.3. Using good error-correcting codes (see for instance [MS77]), this lemma could be generalized
to the case whenM implements Array Maintenance problem with probability 1−pfail < 1, i.e.,M is allowed
to return a wrong value for each of its input read operations with a small constant probability pfail. The graph
Gn,k would still have (n/k)-dense k-partition with 1 − 1/n probability for some  > 0 which depends only
on the allowed failure probability pfail.
Remark 4.4. Note that the randomness of input sequence Yn,k is used only for the data to be written.
Moreover, the proof relies only on incompressibility of a random string stored during the write block and it
does not rely on the addresses used to store this data. Thus, the same proof goes through even for semi-offline
ORAMs, i.e., if we allow the ORAM to know the type and address of each input operation in y in advance.
On the other hand, as our proof uses interleaved sequences of write blocks and read blocks, it is unlikely that
it would be possible to extend it to the read-only online ORAM model of Weiss and Wichs [WW18].
Note that using an averaging argument we can assume that the probability in Lemma 4.2 is only over
the randomness ofM. Thus we get the following corollary proving for every k the existence of a single input
sequence whose corresponding access graph has n5k -dense k-partition with high probability.
Corollary 4.5. For any even integer n ≥ 10 and an integer k ≥ 1 such that k ≤ n10(m+2 logn+11) there is an
input sequence yn,k of length n such that G(A(M, yn,k)) has a (n/5k)-dense k-partition with probability at
least 1− 1n .
We show that by statistical security of M, this property holds for a single input sequence and many
different values of k.
Lemma 4.6. Let n,m,M,w,M be as in the beginning of this section, and assume n is even and n ≥ 10.
Let y be an input sequence to M of length n. If M is a statistically secure online ORAM then for every
k ∈
{
1, 2, . . . ,
⌊
n
10(m+2 logn+11)
⌋}
Pr [G(A(M, y)) has an (n/5k)-dense k-partition] ≥ 3
5
.
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Proof. For contradiction, suppose that for some k the probability is less than 3/5. From the statistical
security of M we know that the statistical distance SD (A(M, y), A(M, yn,k)) ≤ 14 where yn,k is given by
Corollary 4.5. By Corollary 4.5 the sequence yn,k gives us a graph G(A(M, yn,k)) which has an (n/5k)-
dense k-partition with probability at least 1 − 1/n ≥ 9/10. Define a function f`,k on ordered graphs
that is an indicator of having an `-dense k-partition. Applying Proposition 2.3 with X ← G(A(M, y)),
Y ← G(A(M, yn,k)), and f = fn/5k,k, we can conclude that G(A(M, y)) has an (n/5k)-dense k-partition
with probability at least 3/4− 1/10 ≥ 3/5.
We are ready to prove our main theorem for statistically secure ORAM.
Theorem 4.7. There are constants c0, c1 > 0 such that for any integers m,w ≥ 1 and M ≥ n ≥ c0 where
m ≤ √n and M ≤ 2w, any statistically secure online ORAM M with address range M , cell size w bits and
m cells of internal memory must perform at least c1n log n server probes in expectation (the expectation is
over the randomness ofM) on any input sequence of length n.
Proof. Fix an ORAM machine M. Consider any input sequence y to M of length n. By Lemma 4.6 for
every k, such that 1 ≤ k ≤
⌊
n
10(m+2 logn+11)
⌋
, we get that
Pr [G(A(M, y)) has an (n/5k)-dense k-partition] ≥ 3
5
.
Applying Corollary 3.4 with s = 1, t =
⌊
n
10(m+2 logn+11)
⌋
, ` =
⌊
n
5
⌋
, and p = 3/5, we can lower bound the
expected number of edges in G(A(M, y)) by
3n
50
⌊
log4
⌊
n
10(m+ 2 log n+ 11)
⌋⌋
.
For n ≥ 1000,
⌊
n
10(m+2 logn+11)
⌋
≥
√
n
40 . Hence, the expected number of edges in G(A(M, y)) is at least
3
100 ·n log
√
n
40 ≥ 1100 ·n log n, provided c0 is large enough. Since the indegree of each vertex of an access graph
is at most one, the expected number of vertices in G(A(M, y)), which is the same as the expected number
of probes in A(M, y), is at least 1100 · n log n.
Next, we prove Ω(log n) lower bound for ORAMs satisfying strong computational security from Defini-
tion 2.6.
Lemma 4.8. Let m,M,w : N→ N be non-decreasing functions such that for all n large enough: m(n) ≤ √n
and n ≤ M(n) ≤ 2w(n). Let {Mn}n∈N be a sequence of online ORAMs with address range M(n), cell size
w(n) bits and m(n) cells of internal memory which satisfy strong computational security. Let {yn}n∈N be an
infinite family of input sequences where |yn| = n, for each n ∈ N.
Then there exists n0 such that for every n ≥ n0 and for every k ∈
{
1, 2, . . . ,
⌊
n
10(m(n)+2 logn+11)
⌋}
Pr [G(A(Mn, yn)) has an (n/5k)-dense k-partition] ≥ 3
5
.
Proof. For contradiction, assume there are infinitely many pairs of integers (n, k), s.t. k ≤
⌊
n
10(m(n)+2 logn+11)
⌋
and that the probability that yn has an (n/5k)-dense k-partition is less than 3/5.
Let D be an algorithm which given two input sequences y and y′ of length n and an access sequence
A(Mn, z), where z ∈ {y, y′}, does the following:
1. Compute n.
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2. Compute k′ to be the number of blocks of consecutive reads of length bn/k′c in the input sequence y′.
3. If A(Mn, z) does not have (n/5k′)-dense k′-partition D returns “1” (i.e. D guesses that z = y).
4. Otherwise D returns “1” with probability 1/2 and “2” with probability 1/2 (i.e. D guesses at random).
There is a polynomial time greedy algorithm determining whether the graph G(A(Mn, z)) contains an
`-dense k-partition. Thus algorithm D runs in time polynomial in the length of the access sequence A(Mn, z).
Let yn,k be a sequence from Corollary 4.5. So, G(A(Mn, yn,k)) has an (n/5k)-dense k-partition with
probability at least 1− 1/n ≥ 9/10. Observe that if y = yn and y′ = yn,k then:
|Pr[D(yn, yn,k, A(Mn, yn)) = 1]− Pr[D(yn, yn,k, A(Mn, yn,k)) = 1]| ≥
(
2
5
+
3
5
· 1
2
)
−
(
1
10
+
9
10
· 1
2
)
=
3
20
.
By the assumption D returns “1” in step 3 on A(Mn, yn) with probability at least 2/5. By Corollary 4.5 D
answers “1” on A(Mn, yn,k) with probability at most 1/10.
This contradicts the strong computational security ofMn as D should not distinguish between y and y′
with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 4.9. Let m,M,w : N → N be non-decreasing functions such that for all n large enough: m(n) ≤√
n and n ≤ M(n) ≤ 2w(n). Let {Mn}n∈N be a sequence of online ORAMs with address range M(n), cell
size w(n) bits and m(n) cells of internal memory which satisfy strong computational security. Let {yn}n∈N
be an infinite family of input sequences where |yn| = n, for each n ∈ N.
There are constants c0, c1 > 0, such that for any n ≥ c0, Mn must perform in expectation at least
c1n log n server probes on the input sequence yn.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 4.7 but we use Lemma 4.8 instead of Lemma 4.6.
Note that the different order of quantifiers is caused by different order of quantifiers in Lemma 4.6 and in
Lemma 4.8.
In the rest of this section, we prove an ω(1) lower bound for ORAMs satisfying weak computational
security from Definition 2.6. Note that in the case of weak computational security it is unclear which k
should the adversary use to distinguish y and y′. Thus, we cannot directly conclude that y has n5k -dense
k-partition for every n and k ≤
⌊
n
10(m(n)+2 logn+11)
⌋
. On the other hand, for every k there could be only
finitely many values n such that there is an input sequence of length n which has no n5k -dense k-partition.
This fact allows us to prove the ω(1) lower bound for weak computational security.
Theorem 4.10. Let m,M,w : N→ N be non-decreasing functions such that for all n large enough: m(n) ≤√
n and n ≤ M(n) ≤ 2w(n). Let {Mn}n∈N be a sequence of online ORAMs with address range M(n), cell
size w(n) bits and m(n) cells of internal memory which satisfy weak computational security. Let {yn}n∈N be
a sequence of input sequences where |yn| = n, for each n ∈ N.
For any constant c1 > 0 there is a constant c0 > 0, such that for any n ≥ c0, Mn must perform in
expectation at least c1n server probes on the input sequence yn.
In particular there is no computationally secure online ORAM with constant bandwidth overhead O(1).
Proof. For each n ∈ N, define k(n) to be the smallest k such that
Pr[G(A(Mn, yn)) has (n/5k)-dense k-partition] < 1/2.
Using Corollary 3.4 we get for each n large enough that the expected number of edges in G(A(Mn, yn))
is at least c · n log k(n), for some absolute constant c > 0. It suffices to show that k(n) → ∞ as n → ∞.
There cannot exist a constant k such that Yn has (n/5k)-dense k-partition with probability less than 12 for
infinitely many n. Otherwise {yn}n would be computationally distinguishable from {Yn,k}n (by the greedy
algorithm which has k hard-wired). So, k(n)→∞ as n→∞.
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5 Alternative Definitions for Oblivious RAM
In this section, we recall some alternative definitions for ORAM which appeared in the literature and explain
the relation of our lower bound to those models.
The definition of Larsen and Nielsen. Larsen and Nielsen (see Definition 4 in [LN18]) required that
for any two input sequences of equal length, the corresponding distributions of access sequences cannot be
distinguished with probability greater than 1/4 by any algorithm running in polynomial time in the sum of
the following terms: the length of the input sequence, logarithm of the number of memory cells (i.e., log n),
and the size of a memory cell (i.e., log n for the most natural parameters). We show that their definition
implies statistical closeness as considered in our work (see the statistical security property in Definition 2.6).
Therefore, any lower bound on the bandwidth overhead of ORAM satisfying our definition implies a matching
lower bound w.r.t. the definition of Larsen and Nielsen [LN18].
To this end, let us show that if two distributions of access sequences are not statistically close, then
they are distinguishable in the sense of Larsen and Nielsen. Assume there exist two input sequences y
and y′ of equal lengths, for which the access sequences A(M, y) and A(M, y′) have statistical distance
greater than 1/4. We define a distinguisher algorithm D that on access sequence x outputs 1 whenever
Pr[A(M, y) = x] > Pr[A(M, y′) = x], outputs 0 whenever Pr[A(M, y) = x] < Pr[A(M, y′) = x], and
outputs a uniformly random bit whenever Pr[A(M, y) = x] = Pr[A(M, y′) = x]. It follows from definition
of D, basic properties of statistical distance (see Proposition 2.2), and our assumption about the statistical
distance of A(M, y) and A(M, y′) that
|Pr[D(A(M, y)) = 1]− Pr[D(A(M, y′)) = 1]| = SD (A(M, y), A(M, y′)) > 1
4
.
Note that D can be specific for the pair of the two input sequences y and y′ and it can have all the significant
information about the distributions A(M, y) and A(M, y′) hardwired. For example, it is sufficient to store
a string describing for each access sequence x whether it is more, less, or equally likely under A(M, y) or
A(M, y′). Even though such string is of exponential size w.r.t. the length of the access pattern, D needs to
simply access the position corresponding to the observed access pattern to output its decision as described
above. Thus, D can run in linear time in the length of the access sequence (which is polynomial in the length
of the input sequence) and distinguishes the two access sequences with probability greater than 1/4.
The definition of Goldreich and Ostrovsky. Unlike the original definition of ORAM from Goldre-
ich [Gol87] and Ostrovsky [Ost90], the definition of ORAM presented in Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96]
postulates an alternative security requirement. However, the alternative definition suffers from an issue
which is not present in the original definition and which, to the best of our knowledge, was not pointed out
in the literature. In particular, the definition in [GO96] can be satisfied by a dummy ORAM construction
with only a constant overhead and without achieving any indistinguishability of the access sequences. Given
that Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] might serve as a primary reference for our community, we explain the
issue in the following paragraph to help preventing the use of the problematic definition in future works.
Recall the definition of ORAM with perfect security from Goldreich and Ostrovsky (Definition 2.3.1.3 in
[GO96]):
Goldreich-Ostrovsky security: For any two input sequences y and y′, if the length distributions |A(M, y)|
and |A(M, y′)| are identical, then A(M, y) and A(M, y′) are identical.
As we show, this requirement can be satisfied by creating an ORAM that makes sure that on any two
distinct sequences y, y′, the length distributions |A(M, y)| and |A(M, y′)| differ. Note that no indistinguisha-
bility is required in that case and the ORAM can then reveal the access pattern of the input sequence.
To this end, we describe an ORAM with a constant overhead so that |A(M, y)| ∈ {2|y|, 2|y| + 1} and
the distribution |A(M, y)| encodes the sequence y. The ORAM proceeds by performing every operation
yi directly on the server followed by a read operation from address 1. After the last instruction in y, the
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ORAM selects a random sequence of operations r of length |y| and if r is lexicographically smaller than
y then the ORAM performs an extra read from address 1 before terminating. Note that this ORAM can
be efficiently implemented using constant amount of internal memory by comparing the input sequence to
the randomly selected one online. Also, the machine does not need to know the length of the sequence in
advance. Finally, the length distribution |A(M, y)| is clearly different for each input sequence y. Given that
the above definition of ORAM of Goldreich and Ostrovsky allows the dummy construction with a constant
overhead, we do not hope to extend our lower bound towards this definition.
One could object that the above dummy ORAM exploits the fact that indistinguishability of access se-
quences must hold only if the length distributions are identical. However, it is possible to construct a similar
dummy ORAM with low overhead satisfying even the following relaxation of the definition requiring indis-
tinguishability of access sequences corresponding to any pair of y and y′ for which |A(M,y)| and |A(M,y′)|
are statistically close (i.e., the indistinguishability is required for a potentially larger set of access patterns):
Relaxation of Goldreich-Ostrovsky security: For any two input sequences y and y′, if the length
distributions |A(M, y)| and |A(M, y′)| are statistically close, then A(M, y) and A(M, y′) are statistically
close.
We show there is a dummy ORAMM with a constant overhead such that for any two input sequences
y and y′ which differ in their accessed memory locations, the statistical distance SD (|A(M, y)|, |A(M, y′)|)
is at least 1nM (where n = |y| = |y′| and M is the size of address range).
The ORAM M works as follows. At the beginning, the ORAM picks i ∈ [n] and r ∈ [M ] uniformly at
random. Then for j = 1, . . . n, it executes each of the input operations (oj , aj , dj) directly on the server.
For each j < i, it performs two additional reads from address 1 after executing the j-th input operation.
For j = i, after the i-th input operation it performs two additional reads from address 1 if r ≤ ai, and it
performs one additional read from address 1 if r > ai. For j > i, it performs each of the input operations
without any additional read.
It is straightforward to verify that the distribution of |A(M, y)| satisfies: for each i ∈ [n], Pr[|A(M, y)| =
n+ 2i] = ainM . Hence, for any pair y and y
′ of two input sequences of length n, if the sequences of addresses
accessed by them differ then the statistical distance between the distributions of |A(M, y)| and |A(M, y′)| is
at least 1/nM . If M is polynomial in n this means that their distance is at least 1poly(n) . Thus,M satisfies
even the stronger variant of the definition from [GO96] even though its access sequence leaks the addresses
from the input sequence.
It was previously shown by Haider, Khan and van Dijk [HKvD17] that there exists an ORAM construction
which reveals all memory accesses from the input sequence while satisfying the definition of Goldreich
and Ostrovsky from [GO96]. However, their construction has an exponential bandwidth overhead which
makes it insufficient to demonstrate any issue with the definition of Goldreich and Ostrovsky. Clearly, any
definition of ORAM can disregard constructions with super-linear overhead as a perfectly secure ORAM
(with linear overhead) can be constructed by simply passing over the whole server memory for each input
operation. Unlike the construction of [HKvD17], our constructions of the dummy ORAMs with constant
bandwidth overhead exemplify that the definition of Goldreich and Ostrovsky from [GO96] is problematic
in the interesting regime of parameters.
Simulation-based definitions. The recent work of Asharov et al. [AKL+18] employs a simulation-based
definition parameterized by a functionality which implements an oblivious data structure. Our lower bounds
directly extend to their stronger definition when the functionality implements Array Maintenance. Moreover,
our techniques can be adapted to give lower bounds for functionalities implementing stacks, queues and others
considered in [JLN19].
Weak vs. strong computational security. In this work, we distinguish between weak and strong
computational security (see Definition 2.6). Our techniques do not allow to prove matching bounds for
ORAMs satisfying the two notions and we show Ω(log n) lower bound only w.r.t. strong computational
security. Though, as we noted in Section 1.1, even the ω(1) lower bound for online ORAMs satisfying weak
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computational security is an interesting result in the light of the work of Boyle and Naor [BN16]. It follows
from [BN16] that any super-constant lower bound for offline ORAM would imply super-linear lower bounds
on size of sorting circuits – which would constitute a major breakthrough in computational complexity. The
main result from Boyle and Naor [BN16] can be rephrased using our notation as follows.
Theorem 5.1 (Theorem 3.1 [BN16]). Suppose there exists a Boolean circuit ensemble C = {C(n,w)}n,w of
size s(n,w), such that each C(n,w) takes as input n words each of size w bits, and outputs the words in sorted
order. Then for word size w ∈ Ω(log n)∩no(1) and constant internal memory m ∈ O(1), there exists a secure
offline ORAM (as per Definition 2.8 [BN16]) with total bandwidth and computation O(n logw+s(2n/w,w)).
Moreover, the additive factor of O(n logw) follows from the transpose part of the algorithm of [BN16]
(see Figures 1 and 2 in [BN16]). As Boyle and Naor showed in their appendix (Remark B.3 [BN16]) this
additive factor in total bandwidth may be reduced to O(n) if the size of internal memory is m ≥ w. Thus,
sorting circuit of size O(nw) implies offline ORAM with total bandwidth O(n+ 2 nww) = O(n). Or the other
way around, lower bound ω(n) for total bandwidth of offline ORAM implies ω(nw) lower bound for circuits
sorting n words of size w bits, each.
We leave it as an intriguing open problem whether it is possible to prove an Ω(log n) lower bound for
online ORAMs satisfying weak computational security.
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